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Abstract :
To analyse the stability of a solution in normal form games of agreement formation, one has to
specify what players believe will happen after a deviation. One possibility is to specify the
conjectures that players may have in the rules of the game.  The objective of this paper is to make
the conjectures endogenous and consistent. To do this, I propose a normal form game in which
each player’s strategy is to say for each size of agreement whether it is acceptable or not. I
propose a refinement, which guarantees that each one of these choices is self-enforcing. For
general payoff functions, which exhibit positive externalities, I analyse situations in which
symmetric players have the possibility to reach a unique agreement. I prove the uniqueness of
this equilibrium. I give two specific examples: a cartel and an agreement to contribute to a public
good.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C72.
Key-words: Coalition formation, normal form games, agreement, cartel, environmental
agreement, public good.3
1 Introduction
Consider a situation in which several parties have to decide whether or not to sign an agreement
and that, if some of them reach an agreement, they will act in a way which will be beneficial for
everybody, even for those who are not partners. Furthermore, suppose that this positive effect of
the agreement increases with the number of partners. Obviously, in this kind of situation, before
deciding on whether or not to participate, each party will pose a certain number of questions such
as: How many people will sign with me? What happens if I do not sign? What should I announce
as my intentions? What is acceptable for me, for the others?
The literature on stable cartels deals with some aspects of such situations. Indeed, the formation
of a cartel in an oligopoly presents the kind of characteristics mentioned previously. For example,
when a coalition of firms decide to form a cartel in a Cournot oligopoly, they decrease their
production in order to increase the price. But the firms who remain independent benefit from this
decrease of competition as well. D’Aspremont et al. (1983) made a first step towards a game
theoretic analysis of this problem. In the case of symmetric firms forming a cartel, they propose a
concept of stability. They say that a cartel is stable if the size of this cartel is internally stable in
the sense that no partner has any incentive to leave it, and externally stable in the sense that no
independent firm has any incentive to join it. They show that stable cartels always exist.
When d’Aspremont et al’s model is reformulated as a game in which each player has a binary set
of strategies and says yes or no to joining the cartel, a stable cartel is generated by a Nash
equilibrium of this game. However, in their analysis, when a firm deviates, it does so on its own
and it conjectures that the rest of the cartel will remain together and that no independent firm will
react. In Thoron (1998), in order to take into account coalition deviations, I introduced a solution
called the coalition proof stable cartel, using a concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium
(CPNE) proposed by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). This refinement takes into account
not only deviations by individuals but those by coalitions and furthermore, imposes a consistency4
property on deviations. The idea is that a coalition deviation can only occur if it is credible, that is
if there will be no further deviation by the original deviating members. I showed that the solution
in the cartel game is unique. Note however, that this is only a step in the right direction since
consistency is only required of the behaviour of deviating players. In contrast to those who
deviate, the non-deviating players are assumed to be passive and not to modify their behaviour.
Non-deviating partners stay in the cartel and non-deviating independent firms stay independent.
Such behaviour corresponds to Nash conjectures. However, because of the positive externalities,
there is a free riding problem and a partner whose conjecture is that the cartel will remain in place
after her departure, may have an incentive to leave. In a Cournot game for example, the only
Coalition Proof Stable Cartel is of size 1.
The role of conjectures in this framework is crucial. Any satisfactory analysis should go further
and consider also the reaction of players other than those who initially deviate. To see this, we
can compare the previous result with those obtained by Salant Switzer and Reynolds (1983) even
though they use comparative static analysis rather than a game theoretic approach. In a symmetric
oligopoly, they say that a merger is profitable if the merger’s total payoff is larger than the sum of
the members’ payoffs before the merger, in the structure in which all the firms are independent.
That is, they compare the situation with the existing coalition to one in which the coalition
disappears. Using again the example of the Cournot oligopoly, they show that the profitable
mergers are the largest ones, including the grand coalition. In the game theory framework,
making their comparison, and looking for those cartels which are profitable in this sense, could
be interpreted as looking for a stable cartel in which any member conjectures that her own
deviation will provoke the complete collapse of the cartel. Thus, she has a specific conjecture
about how the non-deviating members of the cartel will react to her deviation. The source of the
difference between their results and those already mentioned (Thoron (1998)) is now clear. The
fact that large coalitions are stable can be simply explained by the fact that this conjecture
effectively dissuades any partner from deviating.5
It should be clear now that the way in which we model games of agreement formation is still not
fully satisfactory. What one would like is that conjectures about the reactions of other players
should, in some sense, be rational. Up to this point only coalition deviations have been required
to be rational or consistent. But one would also like these conjectures as to the reactions of all
players to a change should be consistent.
Diamantoudi (2001) addressed this question in the framework of the theory of social situations.
She modifies D’Aspremont et al (1983)’s internal and external stability concepts to propose a
solution concept in the spirit of the abstract stable set. She envisages a sequence of reactions to an
individual deviation. A cartel is internally stable if there does not exist a finite sequence of stable
cartels such that a partner deviating from the initial cartel is, after the sequence of reactions,
better off. External stability is revised in the same way. Applying this concept to a partition
function derived from the original D’Aspremont et al. oligopoly in which the cartel is a price
leader, she shows that there is a unique set of stable cartels.
In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of conjectures in the non-cooperative framework of
strategic games. I propose a normal form game in which arbitrary conjectures about other
players’ reactions to deviations are no longer needed as a result of a richer specification of the
strategy spaces. The idea is simple. Given the rules of the game, the strategy profile should allow
one to determine what happens if a player or a group deviates.
To this end, I introduce a new notion of strategy, which is, for each player, to say, in the list of all
the possible agreements, which ones are acceptable to her. This is rather natural since any player
may find several different agreements acceptable. Indeed, in many situations in which a player is
ready to negotiate an agreement, it is easy to imagine that she is willing to accept several possible
agreements. Her objective is to reach the best choice available but since she does not know, a6
priori, which agreement will form, she has an interest at the outset in specifying those which are
acceptable. This is also the idea of the normal form game in which the players have to choose
their strategies simultaneously.
Hence, for a given strategy profile, different sizes of agreements will be acceptable and feasible.
However, it is assumed that the only feasible agreements which will be realised are those which
are Pareto efficient. What happens if a player or group deviates from this strategy profile? She, or
they, will do so by choosing a strategy which no longer results in the current agreements. Given
that all the players have listed the agreements that they are prepared to accept, the new
agreements which are now feasible are determined. Therefore, the new agreements which will be
achieved depend on the new strategies of the deviating players, but also on the strategies of the
non-deviating players. I introduce a specific refinement of the Nash equilibrium which ensures
that the complete strategy of each player is self enforcing.
I specify rather weak general assumptions on payoff functions exhibiting positive externalities.
Such functions may describe many examples other than cartels or mergers in which an agreement
generates positive externalities. The same kind of phenomenon occurs, for example, when the
agreement involves contributions to the production of a public good. That is why I will
systematically use the generic term of agreement. Whatever the context, for any function
satisfying these conditions, I can prove the uniqueness of the stable agreement and I give an
algorithm to determine its size.
The properties of the general payoff function are presented in the following section. In Section 3,
I present the game G of agreement formation and the results when Nash, Strong Nash and CPNE
equilibrium are applied. Section 4 is devoted to the presentation of the strong Nash equilibrium in
restricted games, the proof of its uniqueness and the algorithm which can be used for its
characterisation. Section 5 clarifies the relationship between the game G and extensive form7
games. Two examples with specific payoff functions, which satisfy the properties described in
Section 2, are presented in section 6. Section 7, contains a discussion on a more general literature
of coalition formation, on the assumptions made in the various approaches and on the possibility
of extensions of the game G. I conclude in Section 8.
2 Payoff function With Positive Externalities
Consider a set of n symmetric players:  N = 1,...,n { }. They obtain a payoff which depends on how
they are partitioned. In particular, I assume that the only partitions allowed are those with one
coalition of k players and n-k independents. As a consequence of the symmetry of the players and
this assumption of a unique agreement, the payoff of each player depends only on the size of the
agreement and whether she is a partner to the agreement or independent. If she signs the
agreement with k - 1 partners, 1£ k £ n-1, her payoff is denoted by P
P k ( ). On the other hand, if
she is independent when k other players are partners in an agreement, her payoff is denoted by
PI k ( ).
The game is said to be essential: that is, there is at least one agreement of size k, which generates
gains for its participants. Formally:
$k,2£ k £ n   P
P k ( )> P
I 1 ( ).
Assume that the payoff function PI k ( ) satisfies two externality properties:
(P1) P
I k ( ) > P
I k -1 ( ),"k = 2,...,n -1.
(P2) P
I 1 ( )= P
P 1 ( ) and P
I k ( )> P
P k ( ),"k = 2,...,n-1.
The first Property (P1) says that the payoff of an independent individual increases with the size of
the agreement. This is the first effect of positive externalities. When the number of partners8
increases, the agreement is more and more beneficial for those who remain independent. In fact,
the agreement is beneficial for everybody. However it is also costly for the partners. Property
(P2) means that whatever the size of the agreement, an independent individual always receives
more than the partners to the agreement.
Now, consider the following definition:
Definition 1 An agreement of size k is advantageous if the per member payoff is larger than the
payoff in a society where all players are independent:
PP k ( )³ PI 1 ( ).
This definition corresponds to the notion of profitability introduced by Salant, Switzer and
Reynolds [1983] in the framework of merger analysis. Here, I use it to define a third Property.
Before I give the definition of this property, note that, because the game is essential,
advantageous agreements exist and denote by k1
* the smallest of these. Given this, I require the
payoff function P
P k ( ) to satisfy the following property:
(P3)  PP k +1 ( )> PP k ( ),  "k, k ³ k1
*.
The payoff function P
P k ( ) is not required to be increasing everywhere. However, Property (P3)
guarantees increasing returns to collaboration from this minimum critical size k1
*. Note that I do
not impose any restriction on the second derivative of the payoff functions. These functions can
be convex or concave or they may even have a non-monotonic second derivative, an s-shape
function for example. I give two standard examples in Section 6, which satisfy these three
Properties: a linear Cournot game and a public good contribution game.9
 3 The Game
In this Section, a normal form game of agreement formation denoted by G is presented. The set
of n,n ³ 2 players is  N = 1,...,n { }. They have to decide whether or not to sign an agreement. The
outcome will be that at most one agreement will be signed. We saw in the previous section that,
because the game is symmetric the players’ payoffs can be defined as a function of the size of the
agreement and of the position, partner or independent, of the player. Therefore, the number of
partners in the agreement is the only relevant variable for each player’s decision about her
partnership. I assume that her strategy is to say which agreements she is willing to be a member
of in terms of size. This means in particular that it is possible that a player is willing to sign
agreements of different sizes. Formally, her strategy si is an n-1 vector in which the kth-
component sik is equal to one if i finds it acceptable to sign an agreement with k -1 other
partners or is equal to zero if she is not willing to do so. Therefore, the sets of strategies are:
"i ÎN,    Si = si = si2,...,sin ( )  sij = 0 or 1 for j = 2,...,n { }
If, for a given player, her strategy is a n -1 vector of zeroes, this means that this player is not
willing to sign any agreement and that she wants to remain independent.
Each strategy profile s  is a matrix in which the row i is the strategy of player i and the
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Definition 2 Given a strategy profile s ,
  i.  An agreement of size k ³ 2 is said to be feasible if: sik iÎN å ³ k.
  ii.  It is just feasible if: sik iÎN å = k.
The meaning of this definition is that an agreement of size k is said to be feasible when at least k
players find it acceptable and are willing to sign. Given this, the problem is now to know what is
the outcome of the game? The first question that arises is to know what happens when the
agreement of size k is feasible but not just feasible? In this case, more than k players would be
willing to sign a k person agreement. I assume in this case, that the partners are picked at random
among the players who find the agreement acceptable and that the payoffs are the expected
payoffs before the members are chosen. Thus we have:
(1) ˜  P  i k s ( ) ( ) =
PI k s ( ) ( ) if sik s ( ) = 0




î  ï 
where r( k(s))  is i-player’s probability of being a member of the agreement of size k(s) when
she finds it acceptable:r k s ( ) ( ) =
k s ( )
sik s ( ) i=1
n å
.
In order to define the outcome of the game, another question has to be answered. For a given
strategy profile, several sizes of agreement can be feasible. Which one will be formed
effectively? I assume a rule of efficiency. The Pareto efficient feasible agreements are the only
ones, which have any chance of being signed, and if several agreements are efficient, each of
them has the same probability. Given a strategy profiles,  denote by k s ( ) a feasible
agreement,F s ( ) the set of feasible agreements and Fe s ( ) the set of Pareto efficient feasible11
agreements defined in the following definition. Denote by p k ( ) the structure composed by an
agreement of size k and n – k independent players.
Definition 3 For each efficient feasible agreement of size  ¢  k  ÎFe s ( ),
  i.  " ¢  ¢  k  ÎFe s ( ), it is impossible to increase one player’s payoff without decreasing that of
another, by changing from p ¢  k  ( ) to p ¢  ¢  k  ( ).
  ii.  " ¢  ¢  k  such that  ¢  ¢  k  ÎF s ( ), but  ¢  ¢  k  ÏFe s ( ), it is always possible to increase at least one
player’s payoff without decreasing another player’s payoff, by changing from p ¢  ¢  k  ( ) to
p ¢  k  ( ).
Definition 4 Efficiency Rule
For a given strategy profiles, all the elements of Fe s ( ) are generated with equal probability.
We denote by # Fe s ( ) the cardinal of the set Fe s ( ). As a consequence of the efficiency rule and
equation (1), we can define player i’s payoff for a given strategy profiles:
(2) ˜  ˜  P  i s ( ) =
˜  P  i k ( ) kÎF
e s ( ) å
#Fe s ( )
.
Now that the normal form of the game is defined, I shall next look for the equilibria. As a first
step, I characterise the set of stable agreements generated by the Nash equilibria of the game G,
denoted by N.
Definition 5
i. A strategy profiles*is a Nash equilibrium in the game G if and only if:
˜  ˜  P  i si
*,s-i
* ( )³ ˜  ˜  P  i si,s-i
* ( ),"i ÎN, "si ÎSi12
in which s-i is a vector giving each the strategy of each player except that of i.
ii. An agreement of size k is stable if there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game G, s*, such
that k ÎFe s* ( ).
A first obvious necessary condition is given by the following lemma. It is a consequence of the
fact that there is a minimum payoff that a player can guarantee for herself. Indeed, she can decide
not to play the game and obtain in that case at least PI 1 ( ) since, according to property (P1), the
payoff of an independent individual is an increasing function of the size of the agreement which
is signed.
Lemma 1 A stable agreement is always advantageous.
Proof First, note that, for a given strategy profile s, each player’s expected payoff is a weighted
sum of payoffs PI k ( ) and/or PP k ( ) with k ÎFe s ( ). Therefore, her expected payoff increases if
the player can eliminate the smallest of these payoffs.
Consider a strategy profiles , and assume that $k1,...,km, such that "t =1,...,m, kt ÎFe s ( ) and
kt is not advantageous. This means that for each kt, PP kt ( ) < PI 1 ( ), and for every other size
k ÎFe s ( ),k ¹ kt, PP k ( )³ PI 1 ( ). Now, each player who has chosen to be a partner in some of
these non advantageous agreements can always increases her expected payoff by saying that
these agreements are not acceptable. Indeed, by doing so, she eliminates the smallest possible
payoffs PP kt ( ) and increases the probability of larger payoffs: PI kt ( ) or PP k ( ) and PI k ( )
when an advantageous agreement k is formed. Therefore,s  cannot be a Nash equilibrium. p
In spite of the fact that the efficiency rule permits a strategy profile to generate several
agreements, the following lemma shows that in fact there will only be one agreement at the13
equilibrium. For a given equilibrium strategy profile, there is only one Pareto efficient agreement,
which is the largest feasible agreement when there are several of these.
Lemma 2 At the equilibrium s*,
  i.  No more than one feasible agreement can be Pareto efficient: # Fe s* ( ) £1.
  ii.  If several agreements are feasible, the Pareto efficient agreement is the largest one:
If k* ÎFe s* ( ), then k* = Max k,k ÎF s* ( ) { }.
Proof
i. Consider a given strategy profile s . Assume that there is more than one Pareto efficient
feasible agreement generated by s , # Fe s ( ) >1. From lemma 1, all these agreements are
advantageous. Consider the smallest of these agreements,  ˜  k = Min k,k ÎFe s ( ) { }.
As a consequence of property (P2): PP ˜  k  ( ) < PI ˜  k  ( ).
As a consequence of property (P3): PP ˜  k  ( ) < PP ¢  k  ( )< PI ¢  k  ( )," ¢  k  ÎFe s ( ), ¢  k  ¹ ˜  k .
For each player who finds  ˜  k  acceptable in s , PP ˜  k  ( ) is the smallest payoff she can obtain.
Therefore, she has an incentive to deviate BY saying that  ˜  k  is not, in fact, acceptable and s
cannot therefore be an equilibrium.
ii. For a given equilibrium strategy profile s*, suppose that several agreements are feasible,
that is, # F s* ( ) >1. Consider  ˆ  k = Max k,k ÎF s* ( ) { } the largest feasible agreement and assume
that the unique Pareto efficient agreement is k* ÎF s* ( ),k* < ˆ  k . This means that it is possible to
increase at least one player’s payoff without decreasing another player’s payoff, by changing14
from p ˆ  k  ( ) to p k* ( ). However, this is impossible since, as a consequence of (P1) and (P3), the
independent individuals in p ˆ  k  ( ) prefer this structure to p k* ( ), whatever their position in p k ( ):
PI ˆ  k  ( ) > PI k* ( ) > PP k* ( ). p
The following proposition shows that the obvious necessary condition given in lemma 1 is also
sufficient.
Proposition 1 The set of stable agreements is the set of advantageous agreements.
N= k   n ³ k ³ k1
* { }
Proof. Consider an equilibrium strategy profile s
*, which generates a set of just feasible
agreements,  F s* ( )= k1,k2,...,kˆ  l  { }, k1 < k2 < ...< kˆ  l . From lemma 2, Fe s* ( ) = kˆ  l  { }. Assume
that all the other agreements k, k ¹ kt,t =1,...,ˆ  l  are unanimously considered as not acceptable:
sik = 0,"i ÎN. Then, the only way a player i alone could improve her payoff, would be, when
she finds kˆ  l  acceptable, to provoke the collapse of this agreement and to become an independent.
Since, then, Fe si,s-i
* ( ) = kˆ  l -1 { }, there is no incentive for player i to deviate if:
PP kˆ  l  ( ) ³ PI kˆ  l -1 ( ).
But for each advantageous agreement kˆ  l , it is always possible to find kˆ  l -1 such that this
inequality is verified, since it always holds for kˆ  l -1 =1.  p
Note that, in the Example 2 presented in the previous section, which describes a contribution
game to a public good, this implies in particular, that all the agreements are stable. At this point, a
first question has to be answered. Is this result a consequence of the restriction to individual15
deviations? With a Nash equilibrium concept, we cannot take into account deviations to form a
larger agreement. However, in a game of coalition formation, it seems natural to use a concept
taking into account coalition deviations. We have different choices among which the most
famous are the Strong Nash Equilibrium and the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE). The
Strong Nash Equilibrium guarantees that no coalition can deviate, by changing the strategies of
its members, when the strategies of the non-deviating players remain fixed.
Definition 6
(i) (Aumann (1959)) s*is a Strong Nash Equilibrium in the game G if:
/  $  M Ì N and sM such that:
"i ÎM, Pi sM,s-M
* ( ) > Pi sM
* ,s-M
* ( ).
with sM  the strategies of the M- members and s-M the strategies of the other players.
(ii) k
* is a strongly stable agreement if and only if there is a Strong Nash Equilibrium s* of the
game G such that k* ÎFe s* ( ).
The following proposition gives the results when we apply this equilibrium concept to the game
G. As far as notation is concerned, remember that k1
*, defined in section 2, is the smallest
advantageous agreement. Now, I introduce a new specific size. Let kn be the first integer such
that the inequality PI kn ( ) > PP n ( ) is verified. Finally, let SN denote the set of strongly stable
agreements
Proposition 2 The set of strongly stable agreements of the game G is:
SN= k   n ³k ³ Max kn,k1
* { } { }.16
Proof. Consider a Nash equilibrium s*, as defined in the Proof of Proposition 2, such that
Fe s* ( ) = kˆ  l , with kˆ  l  ³ Max kn,k1
* { }.
From (P3), when a player is partner in an advantageous agreement, her payoff increases with the
size of the agreement. Therefore, no partner of the agreement kˆ  l  wants to deviate to be in a
smaller advantageous agreement. Furthermore, as a consequence of Property (P2), no
independent player wants to be a partner in a smaller agreement. Formally:
˜  ˜  P  i s* ( ) =
PP kˆ  l  ( )
or








   but   PI kˆ  l  ( ) ³ PP kˆ  l  ( ) ³ PP k ( ), "k £ kˆ  l .
On the other hand, no independent player wants to deviate to be in a larger agreement. Indeed, by
definition of kn we know that:
"kˆ  l  ³ kn, "k > kˆ  l , PI kˆ  l  ( )³ PI kn ( ) > PP n ( ) ³ PP k ( ).
Therefore, each agreement of size k ³ Max kn,k1
* { } is strongly stable.
Now, consider the case in which kn > k1
*. Consider a Nash equilibrium s*, such that
Fe s* ( ) = kˆ  l , with kˆ  l  < kn. Then, a coalition with all the partners in kˆ  l  and all the independent
player is ready to deviate from such an agreement since:
"k < kn,PP k ( )£ PI k ( ) £ PI kn - 1 ( )< PP n ( ).
Therefore, the agreements of size k ³ Max kn,k1
* { } are the only strongly stable agreements. p
Definition 7 (Bernheim, Peleg, Whinston (1987))
s*is a Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE), in the game G if and only if:
si
* ÎargmaxsiÎSi Pi si,s-i
* ( )      "i ÎN17
And for all M Ì N such that # M = m, assuming that CPNE has been defined for games played
by members of coalition J with fewer than m players, given s-J
* , then,
·  sM
*  is self-enforcing; i.e., "S Ì M, sS
* is a CPNE in the game played by the
members of S, given s-S
* ,
·  there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy profile sM ÎSM, such that
"i ÎM, Pi sM,s-M




* is a coalition proof stable agreement if and only if there is a CPNEs* of the
game G such that Fe s* ( ) = k* { }.
 When they proposed this concept,  Bernheim, Peleg, and  Whinston (1987) wanted to take into
account the fact that, in a non-cooperative framework, a deviation can only occur if it is credible,
in the sense that it is itself immune against further deviations. I show in the following proposition
that, taking into account this credibility does not change the results in the game G.
Proposition 3 An agreement is coalition proof stable if and only if it is strongly stable.
CN = SN
Proof. We know that the Strong Nash equilibria are coalition proof (see Bernheim et al. (1987),
p.7). Now, consider, when they exist, the agreements k Î k1
*,kn [ ].  I showed in the Proof of
Proposition 2 that these agreements are not strongly stable because players have an incentive to
deviate all together to form the grand coalition. Here, I can add that this deviation is credible in
the sense of the CPNE, since the new agreement signed by the grand coalition is itself a CPNE. p18
These last two results are rather strong. They mean that, in general, in the game G, taking into
account coalition deviations is not enough to shrink the set of equilibria. We will see in the
example given in Section 6, that it may happen that the three sets of Nash, Strong Nash and
Coalition Proof Nash equilibria coincide exactly. Indeed, this is true as soon as kn £ k1
*.
4 Restricted Games
In the game G, the problem, which arises when we apply the Nash equilibrium, is not only the
problem of individual deviations. The characteristic features of this game are that, each player’s
strategy is to give a list of acceptable agreements and that, as we saw in the previous section, at
the equilibrium, no more than one of these agreements will be formed. However, how can we
interpret the other feasible agreements which do not have any direct effect on the final payoffs,
and do we need to impose any requirements on them?
Consider the class of Nash equilibria characterised in the proof of Proposition 1. The idea is that
when a player envisages leaving the agreement which is currently formed, her conjecture is that
the agreement will disappear and therefore she does not move, simply to avoid finding herself in
the  situation in which all the players are independent. However, the player might reflect a little
more and realise that since no player wants to wind up in this situation, the threat of the coalition
breaking up is not credible.
Indeed, the other feasible agreements which are not formed at the equilibrium and have no direct
effect on equilibrium payoffs, determine the conjectures of deviating players. Because we use a
Nash equilibrium concept, when we consider a deviation, at the level of strategies, the conjecture
is, of course, that the strategies of the others remain unchanged. However, even though other
players do not change their strategies the coalition structure may still be modified.  Players must
then, have conjectures about how the structure would be modified after their move. I will require19
that these conjectures be consistent. In order to deal with this problem, I introduce the notion of
restricted games, defined on a set of strategies in which the maximum size of the coalition to
which a player can choose to belong is limited.
When a game is restricted in the sense just described, the strategy space is modified. I will
therefore need some new terminology to describe the components of the modified strategy
spaces. Given si, a player i’s strategy in the game G, a k–restricted strategy, denoted bysi
k, with
k such that 2 £ k £ n, is a restriction of the vector si to its k - 1 first components. It is also called
a k–restriction of si. Given a strategy profile s  in the game G, a k–restricted strategy profile
denoted by s
k, is a profile which associates to each player the k–restriction of her strategy. It is
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Definition 9 For each k,2 £ k £ n, a restricted game Gk of the game G is a game with the same
set of players N and the same payoff functions but in which, for each player i, the set of strategies
is now:
Si = si = si2,...,sik ( )   sij = 0 or 1, j = 2,...,k { }
Definition 10
(i)  A strategy profile is an Equilibrium in Restricted Games (Nash, strong Nash or CPNE) of
the game G if and only if "k,2 £ k £ n, the k–restricted strategy profile is an Equilibrium
in the restricted game Gk.20
(ii)   An agreement k is stable in restricted games (stable, strongly stable or coalition proof
stable) if there is an equilibrium (Nash, strong Nash or CPNE) in restricted games s*
such that k ÎFe s* ( ).
Let N* be the set of stable agreements in restricted games. As we will see in the following
proposition, taking into account individual deviations in restricted games is not sufficient to
shrink the set of equilibria.
Proposition 4 The set N* of stable agreements in restricted games is equal to the set N of stable
agreements which is the set of advantageous agreements:
N* =N= k   n ³ k ³ k1
* { }
Proof. Consider an equilibrium strategy profile s
*, which generates a set of just feasible
agreements,  F s* ( )= k1,k2,...,kˆ  l  { }, k1 < k2 <... < kˆ  l . This is a Nash equilibrium in restricted
games if and only if the condition defined in the proof of Proposition 1 is verified in every
restricted game. For a given restricted game k, consider kl the largest just feasible agreement not
larger than k. The condition becomes PP kl ( ) ³ PI kl-1 ( ). Therefore,s
* is a Nash equilibrium in
restricted games if: (1) PP k1 ( )³ PI 1 ( ) and  PP kl ( ) ³ PI kl-1 ( ), "l = 2,...,ˆ  l .
However, if kˆ  l 
* is advantageous, it is always possible to find a set of just feasible agreements
F s* ( )= k1,k2,...,kˆ  l  { }, such that this is verified. The simplest example is F s* ( )= kˆ  l  { }.r
This first result might seem, at first sight, to be disappointing. However, as we will see in the next
proposition, when restricted games and coalition deviations are combined, we can actually get
uniqueness of equilibrium.21
To do this I will first prove the following lemma, in the proof of which I characterise a specific
sequence of critical sizes which I will use in Proposition 5. This is the sequence in which the first
component is the smallest advantageous agreement and the other components are defined
recursively. The size kl is the smallest integer such that the payoff to a player who is in this
agreement when it is formed is larger than an independent player’s payoff when the agreement
kl-1 is formed. In other words no individual in the agreement has an incentive to leave it and to
become independent. This sequence is unique.




*,...,kˆ  l 
* { }, in which the first component is the smallest advantageous agreement k1
* and
the other components are recursively defined as follows:
"l = 2,...,ˆ  l , PP kl
* ( ) ³ PI kl-1
* ( ) and PP kl
* -1 ( ) £ PI kl-1
* ( ).
The largest component of the sequence, kˆ  l 
*, is such that: kˆ  l +1
* > n ³ kˆ  l 
* 1.
Proof. Because the game G is essential, there exists at least one advantageous agreement and k1
*
is the smallest one. Following Proposition (P2),P
P k1
* ( )< P
I k1
* ( ). However, (P3) says that
P
P k + 1 ( )³ P
P k ( ),  "k, k ³ k1
*.
Now consider the following algorithm:
Denote by k2
* the smallest integer k such that PP k ( )³ PI k1
* ( ). If k2
* > n the sequence has only
one component, k1
*, otherwise it has at least two components, k1
* and k2
*. Then, continue to find
k3
* in the same way and so on.  p
                                                
1 When the payoff functions are concave, it can happen that kˆ  l +1
* ® ¥.22
I give different examples in the following figures to illustrate Lemma 3:
Figures 1,2,3
Denote by SN* (respectively CN*) the set of strongly (coalition proof) stable agreements. The result
of the following proposition is that, when we combine restricted games and coalition deviations,
we obtain uniqueness of the equilibrium. Indeed, the agreement of size kˆ  l 
* is then the unique
strongly stable agreement in restricted games, and the unique coalition proof stable agreement in
restricted games.
Proposition 5 There is a unique strongly (and coalition proof) stable agreement in restricted
games, which is the largest element of the sequence S*.
SN* = CN* = kˆ  l  { }
Proof.  i. Consider an equilibrium strategy profile s
*, which generates a set of just feasible
agreements, F s* ( )= k1,k2,...,kˆ  l  { }, k1 < k2 <... < kˆ  l . As we saw in the proof of Proposition , s
*
is a Nash equilibrium in restricted games if and only if:
(1) PP k1 ( )³ PI 1 ( ) and  PP kl ( ) ³ PI kl-1 ( ), "l = 2,...,ˆ  l .
In the proof of Proposition 2, I showed that, from a Nash equilibrium, the only possible group
deviation is the joint deviation of independent players and the partners in kˆ  l  to form a larger
agreement. The condition kˆ  l  ³ kn, where kn is the first integer such that the inequality
PI kn ( ) ³ PP n ( ) is verified, guarantees that this cannot occur in the game G. Indeed, we have in
that case PI kˆ  l  ( ) ³ PI kn ( ) ³ PP n ( ) and the independent players do not want to deviate.
For each given restricted game Gk , where kˆ  l  £ k < n, it is still true that no deviation is possible
since an independent player could have at most PP k ( )< PP n ( ).23
For each given restricted game Gk , with kˆ  l -1 £ k < kˆ  l , the condition becomes: kˆ  l -1 ³ k*, with
k* the first integer such that the inequality PI k* ( ) ³ PP k ( ) is verified. Indeed, in that case we
have PI kˆ  l -1 ( ) ³ PI k* ( ) ³ PP k ( ), and no group deviation is possible in the restricted game.
From (P3) we know that his condition is verified in each restricted game Gk , with kˆ  l -1 £ k < kˆ  l 
iff:  (2) PI kˆ  l -1 ( ) ³ PP kˆ  l  -1 ( ).
Therefore, we want the set of feasible agreements F s* ( ) = k1,k2,...,kˆ  l  { } to verify both (1) and
(2) conditions in each restricted game. As a consequence k1 = k1
*, and:
(3) "l = 2,...,ˆ  l , PP kl ( )³ PI kl-1 ( ) and PP kl -1 ( )£ PI kl-1 ( ).




*,...,kˆ  l 
* { } defined in lemma 3.
ii. Note that, if the condition (2) is not satisfied, the deviation can occur and it is credible
since no further deviation would be beneficial. r
Therefore, in the normal form game G, the uniqueness of the equilibrium agreement is obtained
using a specific refinement, the strong Nash equilibrium in restricted games. At this point, natural
questions would be: What is the relationship between this specific equilibrium refinement and
subgame perfection in an extensive form game? Does an extensive form game of agreement
formation exist, which coincides with the normal form game G?
Section 5 Relationship with Extensive Form Games
Indeed, as will be proved in the following proposition, this extensive form game exists, and is
specified as follows. Call this game D1. The players are now ordered following a protocol r. The24
first player, player 1 in the protocol r, starts the game and chooses an integer k Î 1,...,n [ ]. If
k = 1, the player leaves the game and the player 2 has to choose an integer k Î 1,...,n -1 [ ]. If the
player chooses an integer k > 1, a coalition of size k is formed with this player and the k – 1
following players in the protocol. The game stops as soon as one player has chosen an integer
larger than 1 or, if this does not happen, when all the players have made the choice k = 1.
Therefore, for player number m in the protocol, her strategy is the choice of an integer
k Î 1,...,n - m+1 [ ]. The outcome is a structure with at most one coalition of size k and n – k
independent players.
The game D1 is a version of the game D proposed by Bloch (1996): a bargaining game of
coalition formation between symmetrical players. His Proposition 4.2 p. 109 shows that, because
of the symmetry of the players, this game is equivalent to a more general bargaining game in
which the players may be heterogeneous. In this game, the players in the order determined by the
protocol make a proposition as to the coalition they wish to join. If the other members of a
proposed coalition accept, that coalition forms and leaves the game. The procedure is then
repeated with the remaining players. On the other hand, in the game D, as soon as a player
proposes an integer k, she can form a coalition with the k –1 following players (in the protocol)
because they automatically accept. The difference between the game D1 and Bloch’s game D is
that, in the game D1, the game stops when at most one coalition has been formed. I prove the
following proposition, which gives the relationship between the results of the extensive form
game D1 and the normal form game G presented before.
Proposition 6 The sub-game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the game D1 coincides with
the strong Nash equilibrium in restricted games of the game G. Both generate the agreement kˆ  l 
*.25
Proof. I characterise the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game D1 by backward induction.
The only possible strategy for the last player n is to remain alone. However, as long as k is not
advantageous, i.e. as long as k < k1
*, player number n – k +1 in the protocol, prefers also to
remain in the structure in which everybody is independent. She stays alone and knows that the
following players will do the same. Then, player n - k1
*+1 chooses k1
* since it is better to be a
partner in this agreement than to be in the trivial structure. For any k larger than k1
* where
PI k1
* ( ) ³ PP k ( ), player n – k +1 chooses 1, and waits for the formation of k1
*. Then, player n –
k2
* +1 chooses k2
*, which is the first integer such that PI k1
* ( ) < PP k2
* ( ). Proceeding in this way,
we characterise the sequence S* defined in lemma 3 and the only coalition which is formed is kˆ  l 
*,
the first one to be proposed.  r
Of course, it is always possible to express any given game, either in extensive form or in normal
form. However, although their equilibria coincide, the games D1 and G are not equivalent.
Usually, when we want to write the normal form of an extensive form game, we have to specify
each player’s strategy giving an action for each subgame in which she has to move. In the game
D1, each player moves in only one subgame. Remember that the game D1 is characterised by a
protocol. Denote by D1
r  the game characterised by the protocol r. When the player number m in
the protocol r moves, this is because the m – 1 first players in the protocol have chosen to remain
independent and there are n – m + 1 players left in the game. This characterises the sub-game. In
the game G there is no protocol, but we can view each player’s strategy as the choice of an action
for each protocol of the game D1. When a player has to say if she finds acceptable to sign an
agreement of size k, this is as if n – k players have left the game.
To conclude this section, it is worth making the following remark. It might be tempting to
consider the sequence S* as corresponding to the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of an26
extensive form corresponding to G. To pursue this analogy, one would consider the restricted
games Gk  in increasing order which would consider with the idea of backward induction.
However, doing this does not yield the sequence S* and indeed, any advantageous agreement
becomes stable. What restricts the equilibria of the game G is not the order in which the restricted
games are considered but rather the introduction of coalition deviations and thus of a strong Nash
equilibria concept. Hence, a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game D1
coincides with a strong Nash equilibrium in restricted games of the normal form game G.
Section 6 Applications
In this section, I give two specific examples that yield payoff functions satisfying Properties (P1)-
(P3) and which are commonly used in the literature.
Example 1: Cournot game and cartel formation
Consider the simplest oligopoly game “à la Cournot” with zero cost, a homogeneous good, and a
linear demand function P = 1 - Q, where P is the price and Q is the total quantity produced.
Assume that there are n firms and that k of them form a cartel. As a result of the competition
between the cartel of k firms and the n – k  firms which remain alone, an independent firm's profit
is
PI k ( )=
1
n - k + 2 ( )2 ,
and a cartel member's profit is
P
P k ( ) =
1
k n- k + 2 ( )
2 .
Properties (P1) and (P2) are obviously verified. Furthermore, P
P k ( ) is a convex function and
property (P3) is verified. Now compute k1
* as a root of the following equality:
P
P k ( ) = P
I 1 ( )Û k n- k + 2 ( )





2n+ 3- 4n+ 5
2
.
By definition, we could find k2
* by computing the root of the following equality:
P
P k ( ) = P
I k1
* ( ).
However, it is easy to verify that: P
I k1
* ( ) ³ P
P n ( ) =
1
4n
. We deduce that k2
* > n since P
P k ( ) is
an increasing function for k, k ³ k1
*.
The other consequence is that kn defined such that PP n ( ) = PI kn ( ) is smaller than k1
*.
Therefore, all the advantageous agreements of size k ³ k1
* are strong Nash equilibria, whereas the
unique SNERG is k1
* =
2n+ 3- 4n+ 5
2
.
Note that, in this case, the set of agreements sustained by a strong Nash equilibrium corresponds
to the set of profitable cartels, following the definition proposed by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
(1983).
Note also that, the SNERG corresponds to the equilibrium of the bargaining game D of coalition
formation proposed by Bloch (1996). When this game D  is applied to Cournot payoff functions,
only one coalition is formed. Then, as consequence of Proposition 6, this is the same coalition as
the coalition obtained with the game G (and hence D1).
Example 2: Contribution to a public good
In this example, I consider a classic model of public good agreement. This model has been
presented by Yi (1997) to illustrate cases in which there are positive externalities. Ray and Vohra
(2001) use this payoff function in their bargaining game of coalition formation. Each player is
endowed with 1 unit of a private good. At cost c xi ( ), agent i can provide xi units of the public
good. Let  X = xi i=1,...,n å  be the total amount of the public good. Each player enjoys the same
benefit from consuming the public good, g X ( ). Player i’s net utility is given by g X ( )- c xi ( ).28
Assume that: g X ( )= X and c x ( ) = cx
2, c > 0. Suppose that k players sign an agreement denoted
by K. As a consequence of this agreement, the members choose their provision of the public good
to maximise their joint utility: kg X ( )- c xj ( ) jÎK å . Simultaneously, each of the n – k non-
members chooses her provision of the public good to maximise her own net utility g X ( )- c xi ( ).
At the equilibrium, for a given k, a member’s payoff is:
P
P k ( ) =
1
4c
2 n- k + k
2 ( ) - k
2 { }
and a non-member’s payoff is:
P
I k ( ) =
1
4c
2 n - k + k
2 ( ) -1 { }.
Obviously, Properties (P1), (P2), (P3) are verified. The two payoff functions are increasing and
for a given k,1£ k £ n, P
I k ( ) ³ P
P k ( ).
We can find the strong Nash equilibria by solving the following equality:
P
I kn ( ) = P
P n ( ).
This amounts to solving the following polynomial:
2kn
2 - 2kn - n-1 ( )
2 = 0.
The positive root is:
R1 ( ) kn =




The set of agreements associated with the strong Nash equilibria is the set of agreements larger or
equal to kn given by (R1).
We can find the different components of the sequence S
* = k1
*,k2
*,...,kˆ  l 
* { } by solving the
following equation:
P
P kl ( ) = P
I kl-1 ( ) Û 2 n - kl + kl
2 ( )- kl
2 = 2 n- kl-1 + kl-1
2 ( )-1.29
This amounts to solving the following polynomial:
kl
2 - 2kl - F kl-1 ( )= 0  with  F kl-1 ( ) = 2kl-1 kl-1 -1 ( )-1
One of the two roots is always negative. Therefore, the solution is:
R2 ( ) kl = 1+ 2kl-1 kl-1 -1 ( ) = f kl-1 ( ).
 In fact, of course, the elements of the sequence are integers. The smallest element is  k1
*, the
smallest advantageous agreement. Let e x [ ] be the largest integer smaller than x. For each
l, 1£ l £ ˆ  l , the lth element of the sequence is then:
R3 ( ) kl
* = e f kl-1
* ( ) [ ]+1.
 Note that the slope of the payoff functions does not depend on  n and, as a consequence, the
different elements do not depend on n either. However, the size of the agreement associated with
a strong Nash equilibrium in restricted games, kˆ  l 
*, depends on n. Indeed, this is the largest
element of the sequence smaller than n. I give the values of the first components in the following
table.
Table 1: Strong Nash equilibrium in restricted games
This table should be read as follows: the second row gives the value of the corresponding element
of the sequence. The third row gives the values of n such that the corresponding element is the
size of the stable agreement.
Here, we can make the following remark. For n < 9, this sequence corresponds to the special
collection of integers characterised by Ray and Vohra (2001). The equilibrium coalition structure
of their game is then what they call the decomposition of this special collection. By this they
mean the following. The outcome of their bargaining game is a coalition structure. At the
equilibrium, the coalitions which are formed are chosen from the coalitions of the sequence S* as
follows. Given n choose the largest integer k* ÎS*. This is kˆ  l 
*. Eliminate this kˆ  l 
* players. Now,
choose the largest k* ÎS* less than n - kˆ  l 
* and so forth. Thus, their equilibrium consists of30
specially selected elements of S*. However, this coincidence of the results is only true for small
values of n (n < 9).
In contrast to the Cournot case, the results of the two games do not always coincide because with
the contribution game, several coalitions can be formed. Because the payoff function is additive
in the way the public good affects the utility (Ray and Vohra (2001) p.1374 ) k1
* does not depend
on n and forms in each sub-game in which there are k1
* players left, whatever the coalitions
which have been formed already. However, when there are more than k1
* players left, the player
designed by the protocol may find it more beneficial to form another coalition with some of the n
- k1
* players or to wait for the formation of another coalition, rather than to propose a larger
coalition of size k2
*. This explains, for example, the fact that when n = 12 the grand coalition is
an equilibrium in the game G and not in the game D. Indeed, in the game D, player 1, leaves the
game independent, knowing that two coalitions of size 3 and 8 will be formed. In the game G,
players do not have the possibility to form several coalitions. Therefore, player 1 compares her
payoff when she is independent when the coalition of size 8 is formed and her payoff in the grand
coalition. She proposes and forms the grand coalition.
6 Discussion
The introduction of this paper focuses on the theory of cartels since, like I do in this paper, this
literature deals with situations in which symmetrical players have the possibility to reach a
unique agreement, which generates positive externalities. However, it is part of a more general
literature on coalition formation. In the framework of non-cooperative game theory, we can find a
series of papers using extensive form bargaining games (Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999),
Ray and Vohra (2001)) and other papers using normal form games (Hart and Kurz (1986), Yi31
(1997)). In these papers, the outcomes of the game are coalition structures, the players are not
always symmetric and the payoffs are not always decided by a fixed decision scheme. However,
these games which are, from some points of view, rather general, have some underlying
assumptions which are, in fact, quite restrictive. The aim of this paper has been to present a new
framework which dispenses with these.
The literature on extensive form games of coalition formation made considerable progress on the
generalisation of the game D  described in the paper. Bloch (1996), who first proposed this game,
also proposed in the same contribution, a bargaining game in which players are not necessarily
symmetric. He proves several results on the relationship between the equilibria of this extended
game and different cooperative concepts. Ray and Vohra (1999) and (2001) drop the assumption
of fixed payoff division and, in the symmetric case, they obtain as a result, the equal division
which was assumed by Bloch.
However in all these games, the assumption is made that, once a coalition is formed, it is
irreversible. This means that, as soon as a player has proposed a coalition which has been
accepted by all the members, this coalition leaves the bargaining game. This assumption may
have strong effects on the results. To understand this, consider the example of the game D applied
to Cournot payoff functions. Because of the positive externalities, which generate a free riding
problem, players prefer to be independent when a large coalition is formed. Thus, the first players
in the protocol leave the game as independents in order to induce the formation of the largest
possible coalition of the remaining players. The assumption that players can leave the game and
commit to remaining independent plays an important role here. Once the coalition has been32
formed, no re-negotiation is possible, in spite of the fact that these independent players may have
an incentive, ex post, to form another coalition
2.
The advantage of normal form games is that there is no equivalent assumption. At the
equilibrium, the different coalitions of a structure are not binding, but generated by self-enforcing
choices. However in the game G, the assumption that only one coalition can be formed, in one
sense, plays the same role as the assumption of irreversibility. In the same Cournot example, the
independent players, by assumption, cannot form another coalition. The ideal answer would be to
find a normal form game thereby dispensing with the irreversibility assumption but without the
restriction to a single coalition. However, it is true that the problem will then arise of how to
avoid the non-existence of equilibria.
Another assumption which is made in Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) and (2001) is the
existence of a protocol which specifies the order in which players move. When players are
symmetric, the protocol gives an explanation of asymmetric equilibria. However, when the
players are different, we may want to distinguish the two sources of asymmetries: the intrinsic
characteristics of the players and their position in a protocol. We saw that, in the game G, there is
no specific protocol. Each strategy is a list of choices and each choice can be considered to be
specific to each protocol of a simple extensive form game. Such a framework seems to be
suitable for the analysis of agreements between heterogeneous players and a subject for future
research is to find an extension of the game G to deal with such asymmetric cases.
One might be tempted to think that, if the objective is to avoid the assumptions used in extensive
form games, it would be better to use more general normal form games such as those proposed
                                                
2 For example, if a second coalition of size k2  is formed, each member’s payoff in this new coalition will be
P
k2 k1,k2 ( )=
1
k2 n - k1 - k2 + 3 ( )
2  (see Bloch (1996), p. 113 for the general formula). When k2 = n -k1
*, it is easy33
for example by Hart and Kurz (1987). Indeed, these authors propose two normal form games of
formation of coalition structures. In both games, the strategy is, for each player, to give the
coalition to which she wants to belong. In fact, these strategies are only wishes and the strategy
profile a set of wishes, which are not necessarily consistent. Each game is then characterised by a
rule mapping each strategy profile to a coalition structure. In the G rule, a coalition is formed if
and only if all the members have chosen this coalition. In the D rule, a coalition is formed if and
only if all its members have chosen the same coalition, even if this coalition cannot be realised.
Hence, the way the different wishes become consistent and generate a coalition structure is a rule
of the game and has nothing to do with the rationality of the players.
The rules of the game G play also a role in the determination of which agreements are feasible
and which ones will be realised. One definition says that an agreement is feasible if there are
enough players who find it acceptable and the rule of efficiency says that only Pareto efficient
feasible agreements can be achieved. However, these rules are not restrictive and it is difficult to
imagine realistic situations in which they would not be satisfied. Moreover, the point is that they
cannot oblige players to be in situations which they would rationally avoid. In particular, after a
deviation, the new agreements which will be achieved depend not only on the new strategies of
the deviating players, but also on the strategies of the non-deviating players. It is the Strong Nash
equilibrium in restricted games which ensures that the complete strategy of each player is self
enforcing.
Now, one might argue that it is too complicated to analyse conjectures about the reactions of non-
deviating players in a normal form game. In that case, and if we do not want to revert to extensive
form games, a possibility would be to use the framework of the theory of social situations
developed by Greenberg (1990). The contributions to the theory of coalition formation by Chwe
(1994) Mariotti (1997) or Xue (1998) are in this spirit. The players are able to foresee the
                                                                                                                                                             
to check that, P
I k1
* ( )< P
k2 k1
*,k2 ( ) as long as n < 41.34
consequences of their deviations. The general idea is that, as in non-cooperative game theory,
players are selfish and form non-binding agreements but they do not have to specify strategies for
the whole game. This is in one sense a stability analysis. This framework, therefore, allows us to
dispense with the definition of strategies, which is one of the main problems with extensive form
games as Xue (1998) points out. However, there is an ongoing and unresolved discussion about
the multiplicity of the consequences a player can forecast. The only way to solve this problem is
then to impose behavioural assumptions.
In contrast to the latter approach, in this paper, I have dealt with the problem of conjectures by
confining my attention to a normal form game and by focusing on the specification of the
strategy spaces. It turns out that, in my restricted framework, these strategies are simple to define
and have an intuitive interpretation.
7 Conclusion
To conclude, the approach developed in this paper can be summarised and interpreted as follows.
The objective is to find the solution to a bargaining problem involving the formation of an
agreement, which generates positive externalities on the non-members. I do not use an extensive
form bargaining game, which obliges one to give an explicit description of the process of
agreement formation and involves making some restrictive underlying assumptions. Instead, I use
a one shot normal form game in which each player’s strategy is to say for each size of agreement
whether it is acceptable or not. This means that the player will agree to sign any of the
agreements that she designates as acceptable and remains alone otherwise. Next, an equilibrium
refinement called the strong Nash equilibrium in restricted games is introduced, which guarantees
that every one of the choices making up each strategy is self-enforcing. Under general payoff35
functions, which exhibit positive externalities between the partners to the agreement and the
independent players, I prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium, which I can also characterise.
This analyses has been conducted in a framework which is simplified by a number of
assumptions such as, in particular, those specifying that only one agreement can be reached and
that players are symmetric. The ideal answer would be to find a normal form game, thereby
dispensing with the irreversibility and protocol assumptions but with asymmetric players and
without the restriction to a single coalition. However, it is true that the problem will then arise of
how to avoid the non-existence of equilibria.36
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